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I.	Introduction
Nonreductive physicalists have argued that if the ‘problem of mental causation’ has no other solution than epiphenomenalism, then we have more difficulties than we may have bargained for.  A seemingly straightforward generalization of the problem, so they claim, will show that not only are mental properties causally impotent but so must be chemical, geological, biological, etc., properties.  Since this is an absurd consequence, the initial form of the problem must be ill-posed.  In Van Gulick’s formulation, if the argument for epiphenomenalism of the mental were correct, it would show that mental “properties are epiphenomenal [in the same] sense in which chemical and geological properties are also epiphenomenal.”  We thus don’t have much reason to be concerned: mental properties “seem to be in the best of company [because] no one seems worried about the causal status of chemical properties.”​[1]​  




I would like to show that the original point made by van Gulick and others has some validity and that it is, pace Kim, relevant to the problem of mental causation.  The problem does generalize; in fact, it generalizes so as to apply even within physics itself.  That is the domain in which I shall discuss the issue: I’ll argue that we can resurrect the problem in the relation between macro and micro level physical properties — not, however, as an inter-level problem but as an intra-level problem.  This will involve an argument that certain macro level properties are not reducible to micro-based properties on which the former supervene. What results is an apparent causal competition between such properties — a competition analogous to the problem of mental causation.  Do we therefore have to be epiphenomenalists about macro physical properties?  It seems that physicists solve the problem in a different way, by treating — as can be shown in the formalism of setting up the problem — instances of the macro properties as parts of instances of the micro-based properties.  Since parts and wholes do not stand in  competition for causal sufficiency, the analogon of the problem of mental causation does not arise.  Although I do not make any claims about mental causation, the implication of this discussion is that the strategy that succeeds in physics may well work in the mental causation problem too. 





Here is a nutshell formulation of the problem of mental causation as I understand it for the purposes of this paper: As nonreductive physicalists we want to see the world structured in a hierarchy of levels of objects and properties, including the physical and the mental level.  We seem, however, to be prevented from holding simultaneously that (i) the mental (higher) level is autonomous or nonreducible to the physical (lower) level, (ii) that the physical (lower) level is causally closed — that is, every physical event has a complete physical cause, and (iii) the properties at the mental level are causally efficacious, in addition to (and not overdetermining) the causally efficacious properties at the physical level.  We seem prevented from accepting all these claims if we also hold the principle of causal exclusion: If an event or property x is causally sufficient, in the circumstances, for an event or property y, then no z, wholly distinct from x, can be causally relevant (and hence not sufficient) for y.  Given this principle, affirming the autonomy of the mental appears to drain it of causal influence in the world; securing the causal efficacy of mental properties undermines their autonomy and collapses nonreductive physicalism into reductive physicalism.  Let’s call this, more generally, the problem of causal exclusion. 




Let’s look at an example where we can actually compare a macroscopic description of a system with a microscopic one.  Consider the treatment of steady state heat conduction in a one-dimensional rod of length L (Kevorkian/Cole 1996, 614-17).  This system is described in terms of its temperature T(x) and its thermal conductivity k(x) which both vary in dependence on the spatial variable x.  We assume there to be no heat sources and scale the spatial variable so that the length of the rod L = 1.  The boundary conditions at the ends of the system are T(x = 0) = 0 and T(x = 1) = T1.  The equation for heat conservation in this system is

  (1)                                        (d/dx) [k(x)dT(x)/dx] = 0,





The task now is to establish the form of the heat equation at the macro level as well as its solution.  This macro description of the system should be obtained from the microscopic description, Eq. (1), in the limit of ε  0, a kind of continuum limit.  For very small ε, corresponding to almost vanishing micro periods l, we expect the behaviour of T to become effectively independent of the microscopic length scale;  a description that satisfies this condition of being independent of the micro variables is what we call a macro description.   Thus I label a description that refers to specifications of the system at the micro level, like Eq. (1), as Dmic ; the macro description we are seeking is labeled Dmac.  Given the widely different behaviour displayed by the macroscopic T and k (slow variation) and the corresponding microscopic quantities (rapid variation), it is a highly non-trivial problem to show that we can in fact arrive at Dmac starting from Dmic, that is, to justify the macro level regularity from what we know about the micro-based regularity.
I suggest that something like Dmic is what nonreductive physicalists like van Gulick have in mind when they talk about the microscopic level of a system and when they compare the mind-body relation with the relation of  two descriptions of the same system at different scales or levels.  Dmic is a description of  the micro components of the system together with their relations; it refers, therefore, to a micro-structural property of the rod,  the property of having such and such a micro constitution which is itself a macro level property.  The sought-for macro description, Dmac, then refers to properties at the same level as Dmic.  In analogy to Dmic I call Dmac the macro-structural description.




Dmac supervenes on Dmic.  There can’t be changes in the macroscopic temperature distribution of the rod without corresponding changes in the microscopic distribution.  Hence, the exclusion problem should arise in the form Kim acknowledges — as an intralevel problem, a competition between the properties described by Dmac and those involved in Dmic.  I take it that van Gulick and others were just speaking loosely in their arguments; what they really had in mind was what Kim, speaking more precisely, identifies as an intralevel problem of causal exclusion.
If the exclusion argument applies to our case, there still is the possibility that it can be rendered harmless by showing that the properties in Dmac supervene in the “rather obvious and uninteresting” sense of identity on those in Dmic (Kim 1998, 117f.)   This is how Kim ultimately suggests to solve the intralevel problem: reduce mental properties to physical ones (in the functionalization sense of reduction;  cf. Kim 1998, ch.4.)   Thus, only if we can make it plausible that Dmac does not reduce to Dmic , i.e., that the macro-structural properties have some degree of autonomy from the micro-structural properties, have we created a serious instance of the causal exclusion problem within physics.

III.	Non-Reducibility
Can  Dmac be reduced to Dmic?  And in what sense of ‘reduction’?   I suggest to adopt a notion of reduction that is most natural in the kind of context we are discussing because it reflects the technical way in which physicists investigate the explanatory relation between Dmic and Dmac (Nickles 1973;  Batterman 1995; Rueger 2000; 2001).  We define: 




‘Uniform’ means that this limit should hold for all x (for which solutions are defined), not just for a subset.  In other words, given a perturbation expansion for the solutions of Θ,  u(x) = u0(x) + εu1(x)..., in some ‘small’ parameter ε, we require that

       lim ε  0 u(x) = u0(x) for all x.

This is the sense of reduction in which, for instance, (some parts of) Special Relativity Theory (Θ) go smoothly over into Newtonian Mechanics (Θ0), and hence Newtonian Mechanics reduces to Special Relativity.  Intuitively, Θ0 reduces to Θ in this sense if Θ is just Θ0 plus some ‘small’ corrections; the behaviour of the system described by Θ becomes gradually and smoothly indistinguishable from the behaviour described by Θ0 when we go to the limit ε = 0.  A failure of reduction, by contrast, means that the Θ-behaviour is quite different (at least in some parts of the solution domain) from the behaviour described by Θ0, however small we let ε become (different from 0 though).  Note how this notion of reduction relates to the notion of Nagel-type reductions where we require that Θ0 be derivable from Θ.   If Θ0 is not the uniform limit of Θ, then Θ0 , a fortiori, can’t be derived from Θ either;  if Θ0 and Θ are logically contradictory, however, they are not Nagel-reducible but can still be standing in a limit relation.  So Nagel reducibility implies the limit sense of reducibility but not vice versa.     




would reduce, in the limit ε 0, to the macroscopic solution T0.(x) = T0 (which should be independent from the micro variable x).  With  ε as the ratio of the length of the rod L and the micro period l (as defined before: ε = l/L << 1), the ‘macroscopic limit’ of the micro-structural description is the limit ε  0.   This limit, however, turns out not to be uniform: T(x) does not uniformly converge to T0(x).  For large x, the higher-order terms in the series grow faster than the lower-order terms, thus destroying the asymptoticness of the expansion, the basic requirement on any reasonable expansion, namely that terms of higher order should be smaller than terms of lower order.  Thus, T0(x) does not reduce to T(x) in our sense.  Dmac retains some sort of autonomy from Dmic.
This autonomy of the macro-structural description can be further illustrated.  Although the expansion of T(x) in terms of T0 fails, one can still construct a uniformly valid approximation in the form of a power series, starting with the macro solution T0(x) (although these series will not usually be convergent).   The way to do this is to explicitly introduce two length scales in the micro description, the microscopic scale x and a macroscopic scale ξ = ε x.  Thus we consider an asymptotic expansion of T as a function of the two independent variables:

   (2)                          T(x, ξ) =  T0(x, ξ) + ε T1(x, ξ) + ε2T2(x, ξ) + ...

Inserting this expansion into Eq. (1) and replacing the derivative d/dx by /x + ε /ξ, (because we treat x and  ξ as independent) gives, at the lowest order of the expansion: 

   (3)			           /x [k(x)T0(x, ξ)/x] = 0, 		      





To determine the form of T0 further, we have to go to higher orders of the expansion.  We find  that T2(x, ξ) can be prevented from increasing without bound for large x, and thus from wrecking the asymptoticness of the expansion, only if T0(x) satisfies the (“solvability”) condition

   (4)                                            /ξ [keff T0(ξ)/ξ] = 0, 		      








The important point in this calculation is that the ‘derivation’ of Dmac from the micro-strcutural description inevitably involves quantities at both length scales.  You can’t go in the limit from the micro-structural description Eq. (1) to the macro-structural description Eq. (4) without formally introducing two independent spatial scales at which the quantities change.  Once these scales have been introduced, the macro-structural description itself has to be invoked to assure that the perturbation expansion of the micro-structural description remains asymptotic.  The price to be paid for this is the inevitable autonomy of the macro-structural description — you can’t get rid of it in favour of the micro-structural description alone.  Put differently:  Different scales allow us to ‘see’ different patterns in the distribution of physical quantities; a behavioural pattern may be pertinent in a description at the macro level, but may be lost in a micro level description of the same system.  (Recall Putnam’s famous case of the round peg of 1 inch diameter which does not fit through a square hole in a board of 1 inch diagonal extension (Putnam 1975, 295ff.)).

IV.	The Causal Efficacy of Macro-structural Properties




The majority of the responses to the problem of mental causation as a special case of the causal exclusion difficulty (understood as an inter-level problem)  try to resolve the issue by distinguishing, in more or less detail, between two kinds of causal relation.  One kind is supposed to characterize the causal interaction at the physical (lower) level and the other is employed to secure a causal role for the mental (higher) level properties in addition to the causal relation at the lower level.  Distinctions between “causal efficacy” (for the lower level) and “causal relevance”  belong here as well as between “triggering” and “structuring causes”.   Against such attempts at  “denying [the] homogeneity” of the causal relation Tim Crane (1995) has argued that the nonreductive physicalist who distinguishes different sorts of causation is effectively giving up one of the central motivations for physicalism itself:  If mental properties cause in a different sense than physical properties, what is physicalism all about?  Wasn’t physicalism motivated by the hope that one could reconcile — somehow! — the reality of mental causation and the completeness of physics?  
“[T]he problem with denying homogeneity is that it is now impossible even to state the original motivation for physicalism: the conflict between mental causation and the completeness of physics.  So there is no clear reason for saying that these mental phenomena are ‘constituted by’ or ‘realized by’ physical phenomena.  Physicalism has lost sight of its motivation.” (Crane 1995, 235) 




If the micro-structural property of having a certain distribution of micro conductivity k(x) over the whole rod, in the circumstances, is sufficient for bringing about a certain distribution of the micro temperature T(x) in the rod, what further causal work is left for the further macro-structural property of the rod, viz., the property of having a certain distribution of the macro conductivity keff, given that the macro-structural temperature distribution T0(ξ) supervenes on the micro-based T(x) distribution?  After all, supervenience means that once the k(x) distribution causes the T(x) distribution, the values of T0(ξ) over the rod are fixed.  But, according to Dmac, the keff distribution is also sufficient, in the circumstances, for bringing about the T0(ξ) distribution. 




Take the case where the k(x) distribution is sufficient for the distribution of macro temperature (T0(ξ)).  What makes the former sufficient is the fact that it contains, as a part, the macro conductivity distribution (keff) which, by itself, is also sufficient for the macro temperature distribution.  The micro conductivity ‘profile’ of the rod, in other words, contains, besides the sufficient macro distribution, ‘too much other stuff’ — stuff that isn’t really required for causing the T0(ξ) distribution.  This ‘other stuff’, plausibly, consists in microscopic details the presence or absence of which makes no difference to the resulting macro distribution.  The rod’s macro conductivity profile, by contrast, is sufficient as well as required for the T0(ξ) profile.  This seems like a metaphysical advantage of the keff distribution over the k(x) distribution, and Stephen Yablo (1992; 1997) has promoted  this sort of  advantage to a characterization of what a 
cause should be: sufficient and required for its effect, that is, “commensurate” (or “proportional”) to its effect.
“... [C] can be causally sufficient for [E] although it incorporates indefinite amounts of causally extraneous detail, and causally relevant to [E] even though it omits factors critical to [E’s] occurrence.  What distinguishes causation from these other relations is that causes are expected to be commensurate [or proportional] with their effects. [...] Thus faced with a choice between candidate causes ... , the more proportional of the two is, other things equal, to be preferred [as cause].” (Yablo 1992, 434f.)   
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^1	     Quoted after Kim 1997, 288.
^2	     If you find it implausible to think of the conductivity k as the ‘cause’ of the temperature distribution T, imagine the problem (Eq. 1) with a heat source included:                                               (d/dx) [k(x)dT(x)/dx] = Q(x).Whatever I say about k as the cause could then be rephrased, perhaps more intuitively, in terms of the source strength Q.  
^3	     Thus the the microscopic conductivity k(x) and the macroscopic quantity keff are not just related to each other like a sequence of numbers and its arithmetic mean — one of the features that indicate that the transition from a micro- to a macro-structural description is by no means trivial. 
^4	     Yablo actually formulates these definitions not in terms of parts and wholes of property instances but in terms of ‘determinables’ and their ‘determinates’.  But the intended meaning is that a property instantiation Y necessitates the instantiation of a property X “because X is immanent in or included in Y.  This is all it takes to kill the appearance of causal competition.” (Yablo 1997, 275, n. 22)   
^5	    Thus we preserve the causal completeness of the micro-structural  properties (described in Dmic) by allowing these properties to be sufficient for their effects. 
^6	     I am aware of the difficulties of interpreting the terms in a perturbation expansion as parts of a whole (cf., e.g., Teller 1995, 139-141).  Nevertheless, I think the considerations adduced here and below give some plausibility to my claim.
^7	     For the explanation issue see Rueger 2001; for multiple realizability Batterman 2000.
